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Message from the Editors
This case study focuses on the evolution and development of the critical
maritime region of the Russian Arctic out into the future. It specifically
considers what the Russian state may initiate in Arctic economic projects,
and what aspects of this region Russia will seek to control, in what will most
certainly become one of the vital ocean corridors of the world. The case
highlights what factors may constitute the outlines of further development in
a region that is not only important today and is emerging as a vital resource
area and transport waterway, but also one that could evolve into a zone of
competition, or even conflict, during this era of great power rivalry.
The case explores important insights into how Russia may develop its
Arctic maritime capabilities and use this region as a springboard to further
Russian maritime power, as well as overall economic strength.
The author, Lawson W. Brigham, is a research faculty member at the International Arctic Research Center, University of Alaska Fairbanks; a Fellow
at the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute; and a Fellow at the U.S. Coast Guard
Academy’s Center for Arctic Study and Policy. He is also an accomplished
Coast Guard officer, and brings these superb credentials to his analysis of the
potential development of the Russian Maritime Arctic. With this background,
he constructs a line of development between now and the year 2050, and
traces the likely lines of influence and effort it might take to arrive at that
constructed future end-state.
The author constructs a potential future scenario of this vital region, resulting
in a think piece which envisions and asks how the Russian state might bring
that future into being through a variety of factors and strategic positioning.
If achieved, the region’s development might invigorate and diversify not
only the Russian economy, but the overall reach of a great power competitor
in that projected 30-year span. The stakes and the implications for Russia,
as well as her allies and adversaries, could be immense. As a result, the case
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study highlights the emerging and growing importance of the Arctic as an
area of commerce, competition, and perhaps conflict.
As a global power, Arctic country, and competitor in the northern reaches,
how should the U.S. itself consider engagement and response to this potential growing influence? Professor Brigham’s case study helps illuminate the
scope of Russian ambition in this vital region, and in so doing, points the
way to answering the questions posed by these important challenges in the
years to come.
The Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups is pleased to offer this
case within the Maritime Irregular Warfare Studies as a lodestar to
consideration of our own Arctic ambitions and competition, emerging
policy goals, and the need for further research.
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The views expressed in this case study are those of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions
of CIWAG, the U.S. Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.
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Map of the Arctic Ocean

Figure Intro 1 The Arctic Ocean and key features
(Author and Cartography by Mapmakers.com 2020)

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Arctic

Russian nuclear icebreaker Arktika, in service 1975–2008 and first surface ship
to reach the North Pole, August 17,1977. (Christopher Michel/Flickr)

The Russian North and the maritime Arctic are critically important to the
future of the Russian state. This vast, cold region should be viewed from three
main perspectives: national security, environmental change, and economic
security. Furthermore, Russia’s long, open border to the Arctic Ocean is a
strategic vulnerability as well as a coastline that provides essential maritime
access to a remote but developing region. This region, stretching from the
Russian-Norwegian border in the west to the Bering Strait in the east is
notable for reasons including the following:
•	a formidable military-security presence, mainly on the Kola Peninsula,
but also in small, modern bases on the outlier Arctic islands spread
across the northern Eurasian coast;
• a huge storehouse of Arctic natural resources, understood to be the
largest such repository on Earth;
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• a large but dispersed industrial base focused on development of oil,
gas, and hard minerals (such as nickel, copper, palladium, platinum,
and coal);
• a n advanced marine transportation system (the Northern Sea Route),
an Arctic national waterway developed during the Soviet era, supported
by a large fleet of ice-capable commercial ships and civilian icebreakers,
several nuclear-powered;
• a key Russian economic region supported and favored by the central
government with infrastructure investments and tax incentives to
encourage Arctic economic development;
• t he largest Arctic Indigenous population among the eight Arctic
states (40 groups and a population of approximately 260,000);
• a remote but large region undergoing profound environmental
stress due to anthropogenic climate change: warming temperatures,
thawing permafrost, and large-scale wildfires are altering the Siberian
landscape, while retreating sea ice and coastal erosion are changing
Arctic marine systems;
• s everal large, Arctic cities including Murmansk, Archangelsk, Norilsk,
and Yakutsk.
A scenario in Chapter 1 looks 30 years ahead into a plausible future of this
important and emerging Arctic region. Chapter 2 provides an analysis of
the scenario identifying 10 influential factors or drivers of regional change.
Chapter 3 is an overview of the region today, encompassing the essential
background information necessary to understand the complexities of the
Russian maritime Arctic. The concluding Chapter 4 is a summary of
observations and includes a list of key outcomes identified by the scenarios
process. Also, Chapter 4 reviews the critical aspects of today’s regional
development and considers areas of needed research. Discussion questions
are provided at the end of each chapter. Highlighted throughout the case
study are the complexity of the region and its importance to the Russian
Federation. This study is a forward-looking strategic outlook and is primarily
intended as a guide for students and practitioners interested in this vital
geopolitical space.
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Selected Critical Dates Regarding the Russian Maritime Arctic
1990–2020

* See Appendix: Chronology of Key Events, p. 66

Figure Intro 2
Selected Critical Dates 1990–2020

CHAPTER
ONE

The Russian Maritime Arctic in 2050: A Scenario

LNG icebreaking carrier Christophe de Magerie owned and operated by the Russian
shipping company Sovcomflot, shown along the Northern Sea Route. (MarineTraffic.com)

Scenario: The year is 2050. A new Russian president, elected in 2048, has
closed the Northern Sea Route to all international traffic. Also suspended is
the release of marine operational data to the Arctic states under the Arctic
Marine Traffic Agreement. A series of cyberattacks have shut down operations at a major commercial terminal in the port of Murmansk, disrupted
the power grid in the eastern Arctic city of Pevek, and interfered with power
and communications at a key monitoring facility on Wrangel Island. Powered
by the shipborne nuclear generating plant Akademik Lomonosov, Pevek has
had intermittent electricity for several weeks and was on emergency power
for an entire week in March 2050.
Soon after the inauguration of the new Russian president, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and European Union forces had announced
that they would conduct Freedom of Navigation (FON) voyages throughout
all regions of the Arctic Ocean commencing in summer 2050. No advance
warning (such as 30–45 days) would be given. Russia immediately warned
all nations that any voyages in its internal Arctic waters would be viewed as
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a hostile act and met with strong resistance—all foreign naval vessels would
be stopped from entering the Northern Sea Route water area. Canada also
issued a strong message of concern for foreign naval operations in its sovereign
Arctic waters without advance permission. Potential hostilities and direct
confrontation have come to the Arctic region after several decades of mostly
peaceful engagement at the Arctic Council and broad international cooperation. Natural resource development and trade have generally been dominant
in the region during the first half of the 21st century despite increased global
and regional security tensions.

General Conditions
The Russian maritime Arctic in 2050 is an important contributor to the
financial health of the Russian Federation. This once-remote region has for
the past three decades linked the export of Russian Arctic natural resources
to global markets using a revitalized national waterway, the Northern Sea
Route (NSR), to facilitate the transport of liquefied natural gas (LNG), oil,
and hard minerals to markets in Europe and throughout the Pacific. Russia’s
northern region now contributes up to 35% of the state’s GNP. Keeping the
NSR fully functional with nearly year-round marine traffic is a high priority
and strategic focus for the state. Although there has been an increase in
international traffic, the majority of Russian- and foreign-flagged ships have
been on destinational voyages—carrying goods and services into the Russian
Arctic, and natural resources out to global markets—in contrast to transArctic voyages—Pacific to the Atlantic sailings and vice versa. Short-term,
spot charters, mostly by bulk carriers, have sailed across the Central Arctic
Ocean in summer since 2035 during two-month periods of ice-free conditions
and have avoided sailing the NSR and Russian Arctic coast. New container
shipping routes along the NSR to replace traditional trade routes through
the Suez Canal have not materialized as predicted by some futurists and
politicians in the 2020s. However, smaller commercial carriers in niche
markets and select cargoes have used the NSR during summer for trans-Arctic
voyages between Bering Strait and northern Norway. Approximately 9% to
11% of the NSR’s traffic tonnage in 2050 is trans-Arctic shipping.
Global climate change has impacted the Russian Arctic in three very different
ways. First, Arctic sea ice has continued to retreat along the Russian maritime Arctic and throughout the Arctic Ocean, providing for greater marine
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access and longer seasons of navigation. The NSR has been ice-free for four
months, June through September, in its entire length since 2032. Since
2045, the NSR navigation season has remained year-round out of the Kara
Sea to the west and Europe, and has averaged 10 months on a regular basis
to the east into the Pacific from the Yamal Peninsula. The extended navigation season still requires the operation of advanced icebreaking carriers
and icebreaker escort during the winter months; large icebreaking carriers
are navigating the Bering Strait in winter. Second, regional warming has
increased wildfires throughout the Russian Arctic, and thawing permafrost
has continued to cause widespread infrastructure damage in cities including
Murmansk, Archangelsk, Norilsk, and Pevek. Finally, the most ominous
impact of climate change (driven by global mitigation and de-carbonization
efforts) for Russia has been the weakening of gas and oil prices during the
2040s. Russia’s “Siberian resource curse” continues mid-century.
In 2050, the Russian maritime Arctic, including the entire length of the
NSR from Kara Gate to Bering Strait, is viewed internationally as “open”
in a legal sense but also as a tightly managed, national Arctic waterway.
Foreign ships use the NSR, but their voyages are closely managed, monitored,
and controlled throughout their operations within the Russian exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). Rosatomflot has been the lead organization since
2018 in building the marine infrastructure and icebreaking fleet to support
the NSR. More frequent naval operations in longer seasons of open water,
and the year-round operation of Russian nuclear icebreakers, provide a
continuous (all seasons) sovereign presence unequaled in any other Arctic
region. Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)—the so-called “ice-covered waters clause”—continues to
be used by the Russian Federation as justification to enforce its comprehensive
NSR regulations as a way to effectively control marine pollution and ship
traffic in its Arctic waters.
The Russian maritime Arctic is highly secure and perhaps more closely
managed than even during Soviet times. The region is viewed by the leadership in Moscow as an essential area of economic development, a critical
link to global markets, and a set of domestic waterways for exclusive naval
operations and commercial (domestic and foreign) traffic. During 2050,
the major concern for Russia is the continued weakening of oil and gas
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prices, as well as global demand and price fluctuations, making Russian
Arctic commodities increasingly more difficult to sell on international
markets. Additionally, foreign investments by France, China, and Japan in
Russian Arctic projects have decreased since 2035, as future development
ventures are viewed as not economically viable in the long-term. Economic
development in the Russian North without new capital investment by the
central government (state-owned oil and gas enterprises) and foreign investors
has slowed to levels of three decades ago. The annual cargo tonnage along
the NSR has been steady during the 2040s, but major increases have not
been forecasted.

Arctic Marine Transportation and the Northern Sea Route
Since 2030, three major LNG facilities on the Yamal Peninsula along the
Ob estuary, Arctic LNG 1, Arctic LNG 2, and Arctic LNG 3, all developed
by Russia’s largest independent gas producer, Novatek, have been loading
product to LNG icebreaking carriers. These capable Arctic ships sail to
trans-shipment ports near Murmansk and on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
Funded by Novatek and fully operational by 2023 and 2027, these regional
hub ports are used to transfer LNG from specialized ice-class ships to
conventional carriers. Direct (nonstop) voyages from the Yamal production
facilities to European ports also continue, depending on ice conditions
along the western NSR and market opportunities. However, fewer LNG
icebreaking carriers during 2035–45 were making long transits from the
Russian Arctic to ports in China, Korea, Japan, and southeast Asia. The
Kamchatka trans-shipment port has been a successful investment and an
effective strategy to keep the LNG icebreaking carriers solely on Arctic
voyages and to maintain high gas production rates at the three Yamal
facilities. In addition, oil has been shipped out of the southern Ob River
region for three decades, and coal has been shipped from the Taymyr
Peninsula to India. Both enterprises have been under severe competitive
pressure since 2032 because of lower global oil and coal prices. Several
Arctic coal enterprises closed in 2040 due to a lack of global demand.
Back in 2018, then-President Putin had decreed that 80 million tons of
cargo along the NSR annually would be reached by 2024; a total of 73
million tons was reached in 2024. Since then, the NSR averaged 90 million
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tons during the 2030s, reaching a high of 135 million tons in 2038, down to
110 million tons in 2040, and averaging 98 million tons of cargo during the
past decade.
A competing Arctic marine transportation system to Russian Yamal LNG,
a wildcard development, has unexpectedly emerged along the Alaskan
coast. Announced in October 2019 by Qilak LNG (Alaska-based), Exxon
Mobil, and Lloyds Energy (Dubai-based), the joint venture was formed to
ship gas from Alaska’s North Slope at Point Thomson to Asian markets.
Long-term contracts for this Alaskan LNG have been secured in Japan and
Korea, the closest viable buyers. A gas liquefaction facility (built in Japan),
located in the Arctic Ocean 12 nautical miles from the coast, came on line
in 2028. A fleet of five icebreaking LNG carriers (all built in Korea), similar
to those being used on the voyages along the NSR out from Yamal, call
on the North Slope facility every three weeks. They have been effectively
and safely operating year-round along the Alaskan coast since early 2029.
Icebreaker support has been provided east of Point Barrow and during
the final twenty nautical miles into the offshore facility. Only during two
winter seasons, 2034 and 2041, has icebreaker escort of the LNG carriers

Russian floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov, now located in Pevek.
(Rosatom)
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been required in the Chukchi Sea. The North Slope LNG has been shipped
aboard the ice-class carriers directly to Japanese and Korean markets since
the inception of operations; trans-shipment hubs have not been utilized in
this Arctic marine transportation system.
During the past two decades, shipping containers along the NSR on
trans-Arctic voyages has not been an attractive alternative to more traditional global shipping routes. The seasonal nature of Arctic navigation,
vessel size limitations, and schedule uncertainties associated with Arctic
operations continue to constrain use of the Arctic Ocean for global container
shipping. A proposal was put forth in 2019 by the Russian Ministry for
the Development of the Far East to create a state-run container shipping
company that would trans-ship containers in ice-class carriers between
container hub ports in Murmansk and Kamchatka in the Pacific.
A feasibility study conducted in 2020–21 indicated that European and
Asian container shipping companies might be attracted to deliver their
containers to hub ports, with Russian shippers operating along the length
of the NSR. However, major container shippers remained concerned about
the uncertainty in the timing of cargoes and the economic viability of the
route. Importantly, the Russian public and private interests would take
on the risks associated with Arctic navigation. A plan was developed by
2030 for the required fleet of ice-class container ships and two major transshipment ports that would be co-located with the LNG trans-shipment
terminals built at the end of the 2020s. However, the billions of rubles in
infrastructure investments required by responsible ministries and state-run
companies have materialized very slowly. President Putin was a primary
supporter of making the NSR an international container shipping route
between Europe and Asia, and his unanticipated retirement in 2032 created
a key void in Moscow’s political support for this strategic vision.
In March 2029, a successful cyberattack on the Kamchatka LNG transshipment facility immobilized operations for three weeks. Following this
unprecedented attack (whose national origin remains unknown), progress
on funding and constructing the trans-shipment terminals has been minimal.
By 2050, the primary use of the NSR (and highest volume of cargo) remains
the shipping of natural resources out of the Russian Arctic by carriers on
destinational voyages. Some smaller container ships have been operating
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for two decades to the mouths of the Siberian rivers and transferring their
containers to river barges. By 2040, this highly successful linkage to the
river barge system expanded to a nearly six-month season, contrasted with
a short three-month season earlier in the century.

Changes in the Arctic Sea Ice Cover and the Implications
In September 2045, satellite images indicated a nearly ice-free Arctic
Ocean. No old or multi-year sea ice could be observed along the Canadian,
Greenlandic, and Russian coasts. This was a landmark event for the planet
and the Arctic Ocean, as only annual or seasonal sea ice would remain
throughout the winter. The Arctic Ocean had been seasonally ice-covered
with only first-year ice in winter for the preceding five years, an environmental
situation much like the seasonal transitions of ice cover observed in the Baltic
Sea, the Bering Sea, and the American Great Lakes. However, the ice thicknesses in the central Arctic Ocean during winter have averaged 2.2 meters,
presenting a challenge to routine winter navigation by commercial ships.
Satellite observations and in situ measurements during the 2040s have
consistently shown the seasonal sea ice along the Russian Arctic coast to
have thinned to less than 2 meters thick. During the (winter) ice navigation
season of 2048 across the Kara Sea to the entrances of the Ob and Yenisey
rivers, the ice averaged 1.3 meters in thickness, an historic minimum thickness for the region. However, coastal observations throughout the Russian
Arctic have shown the thinner, first-year sea ice to be significantly more
mobile during autumn, winter, and spring. In the East Siberian Sea during
the winters of 2045–48, ridged and rafted sea ice was measured as 3 to 4
meters thick, which has challenged even the nuclear icebreaker escort of
LNG icebreaking carriers on their eastward voyages into the Pacific from
Yamal. While overall the new, seasonal, Arctic sea ice cover is more navigable
in most regions and requires lower ice-class ships, the more mobile sea ice
observed during mid-century has presented new and unanticipated
challenges to shipping operations.
Longer ice-free periods along the NSR (four months completely ice-free
during the 2030s and 2040s) and in the Central Arctic Ocean (two
months beginning in 2042) have caught the attention of commercial
shippers, adventurers, the cruise ship industry, and the world’s navies.
Sailing vessels have completed historic voyages since 2030 across the Eurasian
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Arctic and along the NSR under close control of Russian authorities. In
September 2032, a remarkable sailing voyage was successfully conducted
across the Central Arctic Ocean, from Fram Strait between Greenland
and Svalbard to the North Pole and out Bering Strait. The U.S.-registered
sailing yacht Atlantic averaged 10 knots across the “Top of the World,” a
voyage under sail that would have seemed far-fetched for those who lived
during the 20th century. The new reality of a profoundly changed Arctic
Ocean was confirmed by the global attention given to this extraordinary
polar sailing expedition. Earlier, in August 2025, an ice-class 2 polar cruise
ship, the French-flagged Le Commandant Charcot (powered by LNG to
reduce emissions) crossed the Central Arctic Ocean through the North
Pole. This historic cruise ship voyage set a new and high bar for the polar
cruise industry and made accessible all polar marine regions that were once
closed except to nuclear submarines and advanced icebreakers.
The U.S. Navy has viewed the Arctic Ocean’s newly ice-free regions with
strategic interest and concern. In the early 2020s, the U.S. Navy expressed
publicly the possibility of conducting “freedom of navigation” voyages in
the Arctic Ocean, including along the Russia Arctic, similar to its transits
in the South China Sea. In January 2029, the U.S. announced that a naval
group including a new U.S. Coast Guard polar security cutter (aka polar
icebreaker) would venture into the Arctic Ocean in September. The Russian
Federation immediately communicated its concern that any operation sailing
into its internal Arctic waters would be met with force.
A Russian naval group including the Russian naval icebreaker Ivan Papanin
sailed from Murmansk unannounced into the East Siberian Sea for operations in August 2029. Any potential confrontation was avoided, however,
as the U.S. naval force (less nuclear aircraft carrier) sailed through the
Bering Strait in September and north into the Central Arctic Ocean,
where it conducted operations with U.S. and U.K. nuclear submarines sent
into the region. The flotilla returned south along the same track line into
the North Pacific Ocean.
Similar naval operations have been conducted by Russia and the U.S. during
the early 2040s, each operation benefiting from longer ice-free periods in
the Central Arctic Ocean. In September 2048, naval flotillas from both
nations conducted surface-ship trans-Arctic Ocean voyages with brief stops
at the North Pole.
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Security Operations and Applications of New Marine
Technologies
During the past three decades, Russia has tightly controlled access to the
entire Russian maritime Arctic, encompassing its vast EEZ across the
Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi seas, the largest continental
shelf in the world. Routine maritime enforcement of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) Polar Code and NSR regulations has been
conducted in Murmansk, Pevek, and Kamchatka, as well as also unannounced
underway inspections conducted by the Russian Coast Guard (a branch of
the Federal Security Service or FSB). More ominously, aggressive boardings of
commercial ships underway along the NSR have been conducted by Navy
commandoes from Russia’s Northern Fleet with full coordination and
approval of the FSB. The first such boarding was performed in September
2018 near the Taymyr Peninsula aboard the cargo ship S. Kuznetsou, owned
by the Northern Shipping Company; violations of the NSR regulations
were thought to be reason for this unusual action by the Russian Navy.
Similar aggressive tactics have been used aboard commercial ships in August
2022, September 2028, and in early January 2031 by one of the Russian
Navy’s new icebreakers. Since that time no boardings by combat teams
have been conducted, but at-sea inspections of domestic and foreignflagged vessels have continued through the 2040s by the FSB. Year-round
inspections have been conducted along the entire NSR.
A new monitoring and surveillance system for tracking commercial ships,
based on satellite and land-based shipboard automatic identification system
(AIS) mandated by the IMO, was completed by 2030. New maritime
command centers in Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula and Tiksi in the
Kara Sea were also established to receive this information and data collected
by a series of coastal radars in the Russian Arctic straits that can detect all
smaller surface vessels transiting these waterways. Arctic unmanned aircraft
(UAVs), essentially cold-weather drones, have been deployed on routine
flights over the full length of the NSR since 2032. Operating with the
Russian Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS)—and importantly
not relying on GPS—these drones have also been deployed during the
2030s and 2040s on routine flights to the North Pole, with return to
airbases on several Russian Arctic islands including Novaya Zemlya and
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Severnya Zemlya. By 2032, Russia has completed underwater installation
of fiber optic communications cables and acoustic sensors in all of its Arctic
navigation straits and throughout the northern reaches of the NSR water
area. A small armada of offshore vessels and cable layers had been observed
by satellite each summer for a decade as they constructed this vast array of
underwater facilities throughout the Russian maritime Arctic.
More operations in the Russian maritime Arctic have involved the movement of naval assets of the Northern Fleet during nine months of access to
the remotest reaches of the region. In this way unique Arctic operations
have been conducted and perfected, and sovereign presence has been effectively
maintained. Naval icebreakers and civilian nuclear icebreakers operated
by Rosatomflot have been instrumental in providing safe passage for these
expeditions, which have increased in frequency during the last decade.
The icebreaker fleet has also been essential to the successful response to
several marine accidents in the Bering Sea (2029) and the Central Arctic Ocean
(2034). The Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) Agreement of 2011 provided the
basic international organizational response to these accidents. In the Bering Sea
near St. Lawrence Island, an LNG icebreaking carrier was adrift and grounded
during a March southbound voyage from Yamal. Russia and the U.S. worked
closely to resolve the incident, refloat the ship, and have salvage tugs tow the
ship to Provideniya. Thankfully, there was no environmental damage to St.
Lawrence Island and the surrounding coasts. The U.S. had operational control
(through the U.S. Coast Guard) for this situation, as the accident occurred in
the U.S. area of responsibility under the Arctic SAR treaty.
The second accident, in October 2034, occurred in the Central Arctic Ocean
and involved a cruise ship with 800 passengers attempting a summer crossing.
A small fire aboard resulted in the ship losing power and drifting into ice
very late in the navigation season, with the onset of sea ice refreezing. Icebreakers from Russia (the nuclear icebreaker Arktika), the U.S. (the U.S.
Coast Guard’s polar security cutter Corwin), and Canada (the Canadian
Coast Guard’s John F. Diefenbaker) responded and removed the passengers
and crew by helicopter. The cruise ship could not be saved, as it was
crushed by the advancing ice, but the response effort showed a degree of
close cooperation among the Arctic states that many believed was not
possible in this era.
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Continental Shelf Claims, the Arctic Coast Guard
Forum, and Fishing
In 2016, Russia submitted its claim under UNCLOS Article 76 to the
United Nations Commission on the Limits to the Continental Shelf
(CLCS). The extended continental shelf claim stretches more than 300
nautical miles beyond the Russian Arctic EEZ and includes the sea bed
under the North Pole. Denmark and Canada also submitted Arctic Ocean
seabed claims that have not been completely resolved by 2050. However,
in 2038 the CLCS issued an advisory that the sea bed at the bottom of the
North Pole would not be contained feasibly (and legally) within a single
state’s jurisdiction; it was recommended that Canada, Denmark, and Russia
reach some form of binding agreement that recognizes the “joint and
overlapping ownership” of the sea bed beneath the North Pole. For Russia,
approval of its vast claim by the CLCS for a significant sea bed region
north of the EEZ provides a much greater area for potential oil and gas
resources and for strengthening its northern security boundary.
The Arctic Coast Guard Forum since its formation in 2017 has been an
effective body at addressing practical maritime issues for emerging Arctic
Ocean uses. Most proactive in using this forum have been Russia and the
U.S., although all eight states have shared substantial assets for Arctic response
exercises. An important agreement among the eight nations—executed by
their respective coast guards and maritime administrations—concluded in
2030 focused on the sharing of Arctic marine traffic data/information on
a real-time basis. The Forum’s maritime experts recognized that in order to
provide enhanced marine safety and environmental protection and more
effectively enforce the IMO Polar Code, the Arctic coastal states would
need to share their data on commercial marine traffic moving across their
shared national boundaries. Data on naval and government ship operations
is excluded. The Arctic Marine Traffic Information Agreement came into
force on 1 January 2032, and the transfer of Arctic ship traffic data among
eight Arctic states proceeded seamlessly. The Agreement has been adhered
to by all parties until 2050 and has been a successful model of close cooperation among the Arctic states in 21st-century maritime affairs.
Another area of cooperation among six Arctic states, as well as select nonArctic states (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Russia, USA, China,
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Japan, South Korea, and the European Union), has been on fishing in the
Central Arctic Ocean (CAO). A legally binding, precautionary fisheries
agreement was signed in 2018 and ratified in June 2021to prohibit commercial fishing for 16 years in the CAO. The CAO is a high seas area
without any national jurisdiction and a “global commons”. This prohibition
would allow for scientific research to be conducted prior to any commercial
fishing. Joint research cruises, several by the U.S. and Russia, and one joint
expedition by Chinese and U.S. icebreakers, were conducted during the
summers of 2028 and 2030; the agreement was extended in 2028 for another
decade, taking the moratorium date to 1 July 2044. As of January 2050, no
fishing has been conducted in the Central Arctic Ocean. During the same
period, Russian fish stocks within its vast Arctic EEZ and its continental
shelf have been improving, making Arctic commercial fishing more attractive
and economically viable for the second half of the century. This resource
could become strategically valuable during a period of reduced global stocks
due to overfishing and increasing acidification (and warming) of the world’s
oceans. Investments in Russian fishing enterprises have rapidly increased
during the 2040s.

Summary Beyond 2050
The Russian maritime Arctic at mid-century was until very recently (with
the cyberattacks on Russian facilities) a peaceful area of the globe that is
linked to global markets through the marine export of Russian Arctic natural
resources, principally oil and gas. Coal was a valuable export commodity
from 2019 to 2037, shipped to India and other southeast Asia markets.
However, global demand has weakened commodity prices due to strong
global mitigation efforts to curb the building of more coal-fired power
plants and stricter controls on surface strip-mining of coal. The production
and transport costs of Russian Arctic coal cannot compete on global markets
in 2050. Ice-class LNG carriers, tankers, and bulk carriers continue to sail
on destination voyages along the NSR, although the total annual tonnage
along the Route decreased throughout the 2040s.
In 2050, the Russian maritime Arctic remains a very tightly managed and
controlled set of waterways; frequent naval and law enforcement operations
are held in both ice-covered and ice-free waters throughout the year,
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emphasizing Russian sovereign presence within its EEZ. Advanced and
highly effective surveillance and monitoring systems, both aerial and subsea,
have been employed across the region since the early 2030s.
New maritime infrastructure has supported energy resource developments,
but ports and systems have not been funded by the state or private industry
to support the trans-Arctic shipment of containers across the NSR. The
NSR has not evolved as a major international waterway for trans-Arctic
shipping, competing with other global routes, as envisioned by many earlier
in the 21st century. This is not surprising due to the many constraints of
Arctic navigation in the region (including draft limitations) and the inherent
economics of ship operations of the global shipping enterprise. Whereas
China envisioned a “Polar Silk Road” in the Eurasian Arctic during the
2020s, greater competition during the past two decades has come from
Indian Ocean maritime routes and Eurasian rail from China to Europe,
both more economically viable than a polar shipping route for cargo transport within its own Belt and Road Initiative.
Looking into the future beyond this scenerio, the Russian maritime Arctic,
and the Arctic Ocean in general, will face new economic and security challenges throughout the remaining half-century. A less stable globe to the south
due to a warming world that is severely climate challenged has forced greater
Arctic state cooperation. Although Russian oil and gas exports will likely
continue to decrease, fresh water as a tradable commodity is an emerging
natural resource that can be shipped out of the Russian Arctic to global
markets, especially to European cities. Shortages of hard minerals such as nickel
and copper, as well as rare earths, are in increasing global demand and Russian
Arctic development of these commodities has expanded, offsetting other
cargo losses along the NSR. Cabotage, or internal shipping in Russian Arctic
coastal waters, continues as an essential economic necessity, although limited
investments in marine infrastructure continue to constrain development of
communities and diversified economies along the Siberian rivers. The Russian
Arctic and the greater maritime Arctic region could see increasing tension at
the same time the southern world is experiencing greater environmental stress
and continuing regional conflict.
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Discussion Questions
1. What conditions or assumptions does this scenario rely on?
2. W
 hat other national domestic developments might evolve in the Russian
Arctic in the next thirty years?
3. How might international geopolitical events both in and outside the
Arctic influence the future of the region?

CHAPTER
TWO

Analysis: Key Observations and Influential Factors

Shallow-draft nuclear icebreaker Taymyr, built in Helsinki and St. Petersburg, in operation since 1989,
with its sister ship Vaygach,(not pictured). (GRID-Arendal/Flickr, www.grida.no/resources/3635)

The scenario presented in Chapter 1 illustrates the complexity of such a
large Arctic maritime region and the array of uncertainties and wildcards
that can influence its future. An analysis of a plausible future for the Russian
maritime Arctic in 2050 yields 10 key points for consideration. All are
influential factors or drivers of change in the region.

Controlled Maritime Space
The entire Russian maritime Arctic region is a closely managed and controlled
marine space, although “open” in a legal sense (according to UNCLOS)
for marine navigation. Little has changed since the Soviet era with regard to
control of this vast Russian northern space. The navigation straits along the
length of the NSR are considered under Russian law the internal waterways
of the Russian Federation under unequivocal control. An advanced surveillance, monitoring, and patrol network is in place; one key site is a radar and
satellite monitoring (military) facility on Wrangel Island. The undersea
maritime space is likely heavily wired for surveillance. Polar-capable naval
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and civilian agency vessels are readily available for response, enforcement,
and effective on-scene (sovereign) presence in both ice-free and ice-covered
waters. It is highly probable any freedom of navigation (FON) voyages
would be met by rapid response and maritime force.

The Northern Sea Route and Trade
The NSR should not be viewed as a new global marine route for the
trans-Arctic movement of containers. The NSR will not replace the Suez
or Panama canals as a global container shipping route of choice; the NSR
could become a seasonal, supplemental route to the Suez Canal route for
select niche market commodities. The focus of the NSR is on facilitating
the movement of natural resources out of the Russian Arctic, not on transArctic voyages as an international corridor. It is plausible that future (select
niche market) commercial ship voyages could be made in summer across
the Central Arctic Ocean without using the NSR. However, even under
this scenario, the NSR would likely not be seriously impacted, since the
destinational voyages along the Russian Arctic coast would continue to
make up a majority of traffic tonnages.

Economic Importance of the Russian Arctic
What cannot be underestimated is the importance of the Russian Arctic to
the future financial health of the entire nation. The extraordinary natural
resource base in the Arctic is directly linked to the Russian Federation’s
future GNP. Fully functioning marine systems (the key system being the
NSR, an Arctic national waterway) support these resource development economic health dependencies.

Natural Resource Development and Security
The focus of the Russian maritime Arctic for the three decades preceding
2050 has been on two national strategies: facilitating the movement of
Russian Arctic natural resources, particularly energy riches, out of the
region to global markets; and providing a more secure northern/Arctic
border for the Russian Federation. These Russian national interests are
emphasized in the “Basic Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in
the Arctic to 2035,” approved by President Putin in March 2020.
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Cyberwarfare and Undersea Operations
Security of this remote but expansive region can feasibly be challenged by
the use of cyberwarfare and the utilization of airborne and undersea drone
technologies. Disrupting and shutting down maritime operations have been
successful early in the 21st century (for example, within the global container
shipping industry), and such operations could be effective in this Arctic
region. High-endurance, autonomous, underwater drones could prove
effective in the shallow, ice-covered continental shelves around the Arctic
Ocean basin. Countermeasures are surely being developed and employed.

Central Government Financing
Russian Arctic development in all facets is highly dependent on government
financing and subsidizing schemes provided to state-owned enterprises and
private companies, including tax incentives. How long this critical support
to the Russian North can continue will be dependent on the overall financial
health of the entire country. President Putin’s direct support of this development and subsidies has been crucial.

Foreign Involvement in the Russian Maritime Arctic
There are key challenges for both future foreign ship operations along the
NSR and international investing in the Russian maritime Arctic. Foreignflagged ships along the NSR encounter systematic control, additional
regulations beyond international norms, and a fee system for services. Russia’s
uncertain legal system, ministerial/agency bureaucracy (with its complex
procedures and requirements), opaque import and export rules, and international sanctions all provide significant limitations and constraints to foreign
investors. Key foreign investments to watch will be for energy development
projects and port/maritime infrastructure needs along the NSR; large
investments from China, Japan, Korea, France, and others are important
wildcard factors.

International Affairs
Russia is a key and influential state in international Arctic affairs, including
its work as a member of the Arctic Council, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum,
and the International Arctic Science Committee. Russia’s active involvement
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in the International Maritime Organization, World Meteorological
Organization, and International Hydrographic Organization will continue.
National economic and security interests are the principal coupled factors
in its approaches to both Arctic maritime operations and to international
engagement affecting expanded Arctic Ocean marine use.

Uncertainty of the Putin Regime and Beyond
The uncertain future and stability of the post-Putin regime make futures
work on the Russian Arctic challenging at best. However, his tenure can
now be continued to 2036 (vice 2024) with the June 2020 changes to the
Constitution of the Russian Federation. As history has shown, the transition
of power and the future of Russia’s political and state institutions are difficult
to foresee. President Putin has provided unwavering support to development
of the Russian Arctic during his long tenure, and this support is very likely
to continue. It is plausible to argue that Russia’s resource-based economy
will persist and that Russian Arctic energy resources will remain significant
contributors to the national economy to mid-century (and beyond), despite
the increasing pressures on global commodities markets.

Global Climate Change Impacts
Russia is faced with a major conundrum regarding the Arctic and global
climate changes. These changes have highly influential impacts on the
physical environment of the Russian maritime Arctic, the Siberian landscape, and the development of Arctic natural resources, especially oil and
gas. The profound retreat of Arctic sea ice with a warming planet creates
greater marine access throughout the Arctic Ocean and along the Russian
Arctic coast. Longer seasons of navigation are highly plausible on the
NSR; there also shorter ice-free seasons in the Central Arctic Ocean at
mid-century. However, permafrost thawing has huge (negative) implications
for coastal infrastructure and land access during summer; higher terrestrial
temperatures and increasing forest fires have severe implications. On a global
scale, international efforts to mitigate future greenhouse gas emissions will
create uncertainties in markets for oil and gas. These uncertainties and
commodity price volatilities will plausibly weaken demand for Russian Arctic
energy resources at mid-century and perhaps sooner. This is among the most
serious economic issues confronting the future of the Russian Federation.
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Discussion Questions
1. Discuss these potential influential factors and major drivers of change.
2. W
 hat is a more significant driver of marine use in the region, climate
change or natural resource development? Explain.
3. W
 hat are the reasons for the long-term loss of population in Russia’s
northern cities, and how might economic issues and demographic
trends influence development of the Russian Arctic?
4. How might China or other regional powers respond to Russia’s efforts
to exert more control over the NSR?
5. Discuss how international investors in the development of Yamal
LNG (i.e., France, China, Japan, and South Korea) might influence the
economic outcomes of the Russian Arctic.
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Russian Arctic Strategy to 2035
On 5 March 2020 Russia released a new strategic
document for the Arctic titled Foundations of the
Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up
to 2035. The decree signed by President Putin
states at the outset that this is a strategic planning document to “ensure the national security”
and “defend the national interests” of the Russian
Federation (RF). The document follows a similar
strategy released in 2008 and additional development plans released in 2013 and 2014. In the final
implementation section of the documents it notes
the RF President is responsible for overseeing its
implementation; the State Commission for Arctic
Development coordinates the Arctic activities of the
federal bodies and monitors the implementation of
these Arctic State Policies. The primary RF national
interests in the Arctic are as follows:
•	Ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the RF;
•	Preserving the Arctic as a territory of peace,
stability, and mutually beneficial partnership;
•	Guaranteeing high living standards and wellbeing for the Arctic population of the RF;
•	Developing the Russian Arctic as a strategic
resource base, and using it sustainably to
accelerate the economic growth of the RF;
•	Developing the Northern Sea Route as the
RF’s globally competitive national transportation
corridor; and,
•	Protecting the Arctic environment, preserving
the native lands, and protecting the traditional
way of life of the Indigenous people in the
Russian Arctic.
The strategy identifies a broad set of national
security threats including population decline in
the Russia Arctic and insufficient development of
terrestrial infrastructure (social, information, transportation, communications, and aviation equipment)
in the region. Additional primary threats include a
slow pace of geological exploration of minerals,
the lack of state support mechanisms for business
projects (such as tax incentives or subsidies), and
a failure to meet established deadlines for infrastructure development (including construction of
icebreakers) along the NSR. Noted is the inability
of the current environmental monitoring network to

adequately respond to environmental challenges.
The primary challenges to the RF’s national security
focus on the actions of foreign states and international
organizations: attempts by foreign states to revise
international treaties governing economic and other
Arctic activities and establish national regulatory
frameworks; the “unsettled” international legal
delimitation of Arctic maritime areas (the continental
shelf areas of the Central Arctic Ocean); foreign
state and international organization actions to
obstruct the RF’s legitimate economic or other Arctic
activities; Arctic military buildup by foreign states;
and “discrediting” the RF’s Arctic activities.
Key sections are devoted to themes that correlate
with the RF’s national interests: social development;
economic development; infrastructure development;
science and technology; protecting the environment
and ensuring environmental security; development
of international cooperation; protecting the population
and territories; providing public safety; providing
military security; and defending and safeguarding
the RF state borders. For military security the strategy
calls for increasing the general combat capabilities
of the RF, improving the “integrated control over air,
surface, and underwater activities” in the Russian
Arctic, and modernizing the military infrastructure
facilities (an ongoing activity on the Russian Arctic
islands). For international cooperation the strategy
calls for the Arctic Council to be the leading regional
“association” (the Arctic Council is normally referred
to as an intergovernmental forum) for coordination
of international Arctic activities, and lists “guaranteeing Russian presence on the Svalbard archipelago”
according to the provisions of the 1920 Treaty of
Spitzbergen. (There is strong disagreement over
Norwegian fisheries protection zone around a
Svalbard.) RF interests also include maintaining
cooperation with other Arctic states in the delimitation process of the continental shelf in the Central
Arctic Ocean (UNCLOS Article 76), contributing to
efforts at enhancing the search and rescue network
in the Arctic Ocean, and engaging with Arctic and
non-Arctic states in mutually beneficial economic
cooperation in the Russian Arctic (likely allowing
for a broad array of foreign investments in Russian
Arctic projects).
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How to measure the implementation of such a
strategy gains mention in Section V with a lengthy
list of “performance indicators.” The social, economic
and security indicators for the RF Arctic include: life
expectancy at birth; an index of migration growth;
the unemployment rate (using International Labor
Organization methods); medium wage for organizations operating in RF Arctic; number of jobs at new
enterprises; broadband access to the Internet for
households; RF Arctic share of the nation’s total
Gross Domestic Product (GDP); RF Arctic share
of the value-added high tech and knowledge-based
sectors of the nation’s GDP; RF Arctic share in the
total fixed capital investments of the nation; RF
Arctic share of domestic investment in research
and development and investment of organizations

31

in technological innovations; RF Arctic share in
the nation’s investments in fixed capital designated
for protection and sustainable use of natural
resources; RF Arctic share of the total national
of production crude oil and natural gas; the volume
of LNG production in the RF Arctic; the volume of
cargo shipping in NSR waters including transit
(trans-Arctic) traffic; and share of modern weapons,
military, and special equipment in the total quantity
of such equipment in the RF Arctic (a nod to outdated
military facilities and weapons in the Arctic from the
former USSR). Taking an integrated view of these
indicators should provide the RF with measures of
economic and social development that have not
been easily available in the past.

Summary: Overall the new strategy presents Russia’s comprehensive ambitions in its vast Arctic region.
Development of Arctic natural resources (“strategic resource base”) and their export to global markets holds
a central place in these ambitions. However, fulfilling these economic goals requires a more prosperous,
healthy workforce; growth in the RF Arctic population is needed and incentives will be necessary to attract
other Russians to relocate to the North. Infrastructure requirements (such as seaports, spill response,
railroads, airports, subsea fiber-optic communication cables, and satellite monitoring) and development of
the NSR as a domestic and international waterway have prominence in the strategy. Although environmental
protection challenges are integral elements of the strategy, global climate change is mentioned once, related
to infrastructure challenges (the impacts of permafrost melting). The changing environment and measures
to protect water and natural areas to enhance climate resiliency are included, but climate change issues are
not addressed at a level of importance to their likely critical level of future influence and impacts. The strategy
importantly balances Russia’s multiple interests in strengthening Arctic cooperation (“preserving the Arctic as
a territory of peace, stability, and mutually beneficial partnership”) and enhancing Arctic military security to
counter challenges to its sovereignty and national integrity. A number of these strategic issues and interests
should be reflected in Russia’s Chairmanship of the Arctic Council during 2021–2023.

SOURCE: Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035. Signed by the president of
the Russian Federation on 5 March 2020, The Kremlin, Moscow. Translation by A. Davis and R. Vest, Russia Maritime Studies
Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 14 pages.

Figure 2.1 Russian Arctic Strategy to 2035

CHAPTER
THREE

The Region Today

The ice-free port of Murmansk, on the Kola Peninsula, northwest Russia
(Atle Staalesen, Barents Observer)

Geography and the Environment
The Russian maritime Arctic, the entire northern border of the Russian
Federation, stretches more than 160 degrees across the top of Eurasia
from the Norwegian-Russian border west of the Kola Peninsula to Bering
Strait, which separates the Russian Far East (and Chukotka) from Alaska.
This long Arctic coastline also borders on the largest continental shelf on
Earth, which extends nearly to the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) boundary.1 The dominant geography of this immense marine
space includes a series of archipelagoes and large islands spaced along the
coast, from the prominent islands of Novaya Zemlya (separating the Barents
and Kara seas) in the west to Wrangel Island in the east. Notable are the
navigation straits created by this geography, each of which has been closed
off by straight baselines and declared to be the internal waters of the Russian
Federation since the Soviet era.2
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Figure 3.1 The Arctic Ocean bounded by the eight Arctic states
(Author and Cartography by Mapmakers.com 2020)

Figure 3.1 shows the spatial arrangement of the eight Arctic states and
illustrates the dominance of the Russian Arctic over more than 45% of the
space. Perhaps more telling is the vast size of the Russian Arctic EEZ when
projected out 200 nautical miles from its northern island groups. This
shallow-water region (most of it 500 meters or less in depth) of the Russian
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maritime Arctic contains two navigation straits through the New Siberian
Islands (Sannikov and Dmitry Laptev straits) with waters as shallow as 13
and 6.7 meters.3 Figure 3.1 also indicates the EEZs of the five Arctic Ocean
coastal states that together enclose the international waters of the Central
Arctic Ocean. Contrasted with the more open geography of the Russian
maritime Arctic, the Canadian Arctic is a more complex set of islands and
archipelagoes that define the many navigational straits composing the
Northwest Passage.
Figure 3.1 also shows the maximum and minimum extents of Arctic sea ice
for 2019. The maximum extent on 13 March 2019 indicates sea ice in the
Bering Sea, Baffin Bay, the entire Canadian Arctic, and along the Russian
maritime Arctic from Bering Strait to Kara Gate; conspicuously, the Barents
Sea and the port of Murmansk are largely ice-free. The minimum extent of
sea ice on 18 September 2019 shows a large area of the Arctic Ocean remaining
ice-covered; importantly on this date, the entire length of the Northern Sea
Route (NSR) is ice-free.4
Figure 3.2 represents a more detailed map of the Russian maritime Arctic,
showing multiple shipping routes, all more than 2200 nautical miles long,
that are alternatives along the NSR from Kara Gate in the west to Bering
Strait in the east. Two key boundaries are shown: the Norway-Russia
maritime boundary in the Barents Sea and the Russia-United States maritime
boundary in the Bering Sea and extending north into Chukchi Sea. The
large region defined in Russian law as the NSR water area is indicated and
notably does not include any of the Barents Sea.5 A unique feature of this
region of the Russian Federation are the major Siberian rivers that flow
northward from the interior of Russia to the Arctic Ocean; six key rivers
are shown (west to east): Pechora, Ob, Yenisey, Lena, Indigirka, and Kolyma. The Ob and Yenisey rivers and gulfs currently provide important access
to major natural resource developments in western Siberia, including the
new port of Sabetta on the Ob Gulf that supports the export of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) aboard a fleet of icebreaking LNG carriers.6 The port of
Dudinka on the Yenisey River provides support (via rail) to the industrial
complex at Norilsk (Nornickel), which is the world’s largest producer of
nickel and palladium as well as a major producer of copper and platinum.7
All of the major Siberian rivers are ice-bound, and several support ice road

Figure 3.2 The Russian Maritime Arctic indicating the vast exclusive economic zone, and NSR water area
(Author and Cartography by Mapmakers.com 2020)
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transportation (by truck) during the winter months. During summer, barge
traffic provides an important connection for much of the interior of the
Russian Federation to the Arctic Ocean. As the Arctic Ocean’s ice cover
continues to retreat and allows greater marine access for longer navigation
seasons, these connections will likely become more influential in the economic
development of more southern areas of the Russian Arctic.
Murmansk on the Kola Penninsula and Arkhangelsk on the White Sea
are major cities and key ports in the western maritime Arctic with 2018
populations of 757,000 and 1,166,000 respectively; however, both cities
have experienced significant population losses since 1990 and the end of
the Soviet Union (-36.5% for Murmansk and -26.0% for Arkhangelsk).8
Murmansk and the industrial city of Norilsk (built on continuous permafrost) are the only cities above the Arctic Circle with populations of more
than 100,000 (Norilsk and the surrounding region has 175,000 to 180,000
inhabitants)9; the remaining ports along the lengthy NSR coast are relatively
small cities and towns. Notably, Murmansk and its year-round ice-free
harbor is the major hub port for the NSR and homeport of the Russian
nuclear icebreaker fleet operated by Rosatomflot.
The Russian maritime Arctic remains one of the coldest places on Earth.
The entire region is above the Arctic Circle and has over 2,000 nautical
miles of coast facing an ice-covered Arctic Ocean. The terrestrial regions east
of the Barents Sea are covered by continuous permafrost whose thawing
is impacting marine infrastructure (including ports), Arctic community
infrastructure, and pipeline integrity. However, the dominating environmental feature for this discourse is Arctic sea ice and how its presence or
absence impacts marine operations along the length of the NSR.
The Arctic Ocean sea ice cover has been undergoing a profound change, as
observed during the past four and a half decades of satellite monitoring.10
The ice has been retreating in extent, thinning in thickness, and changing
in character from multi-year ice (ice that has survived a melt season) to
first-year or seasonal ice.11 Simulations of Arctic sea ice from climate models
indicate that plausibly on or before mid-century, the summer Arctic Ocean
will be entirely ice-free.12 This will be a historic event of global significance.
All the multi-year ice will disappear from the Central Arctic Ocean for a
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Average Monthly Arctic Sea Ice

September 1979–2020

Figure 3.3 Summer Minimum Extent of Arctic Sea Ice
(National Snow and Ice Data Center, University of Colorado, Boulder)

(short) period of time, and the sea ice forming in subsequent months will
be seasonal or first-year ice, which generally is more navigable. These trends
have significant implications for the Russian maritime Arctic and the
operation of the NSR. There will be fewer incursions of multi-year ice
(which is more difficult to break and make safe ship passage) along the NSR
in the decades to come, and then a complete absence of ice that survives the
melt season. While the NSR will very likely continue to be partially or fully
ice-covered for six to seven months annually by 2050, all of the sea ice will
be seasonal and more navigable by advanced icebreaking carriers and icebreakers.13 There will be greater marine access throughout the Arctic Ocean
and, in particular, with the Russian maritime Arctic. However, sea ice
variability in the Russian Arctic coastal seas will likely remain high. A more
mobile, dynamic, seasonal ice cover will not necessarily provide an “easier,”
more navigable waterway for marine operations.
The geography of this immense marine space and an extreme cold region
environment are fundamental characteristics inextricably linked to the
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Arctic sea ice extents
Arctic Sea Ice Extent

September 1980

September 1980 and 2020

September 1980

September 2020
September 2020

Figure 3.4 40-year loss of Arctic sea ice 1980–2020 indicating the largest retreat along the
Eurasian Arctic coast. (National Snow and Ice Data Center, University of Colorado, Boulder)

future of the Russian marine Arctic. These factors heavily influence natural
resource development, commercial ship and naval operations, warfighting
capability, human existence in the Russian North, and more, and are integral
to the scenarios creation process.

Governance and Boundaries
As is the case for most coastal states, governance of the Russian maritime
Arctic is derived from the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the overarching legal framework.14 The Soviet
Union signed the Convention on 10 December 1982 and the Russian
Federation acceded to UNCLOS on 12 March 1997; a 12-nautical mile
territorial sea and 200-nautical mile EEZ were declared under UNCLOS
by the Soviet Union to enhance its national security and gain sovereign
control of its fisheries and (likely vast) seabed resources. Russia and four
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other Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Demark, Norway, and the
United States) reaffirmed their support for UNCLOS and its applicability
in the Arctic Ocean during an Arctic Ocean conference hosted by Denmark
and Greenland on 27–29 May 2008 in Ilulisatt, Greenland.15 This high-level
political meeting produced the 2008 Ilulisatt Declaration, which states:
“This framework [meaning law of the sea and UNCLOS] provides a solid
foundation for responsible management by the five coastal states and other
users of this Ocean….”16 The Declaration further states: “We therefore see
no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to
govern the Arctic Ocean.”
Russia has notably focused special attention on UNCLOS articles 234
and 76 and how they apply to the Arctic Ocean.17 Article 234 provides the
coastal state with powers to regulate foreign shipping in order to prevent,
reduce, and control marine pollution in the Arctic Ocean. A coastal state
has the right to adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory pollution prevention,
reduction, and control laws within the waters of the EEZ (including

Figure 3.5 Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement
(U.S. Department of State)
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straits) that are ice-covered for most of the year. Both Russia and Canada
have implemented special rules and regulations in their Arctic waters using
UNCLOS Article 234 as a key legal basis for their shipping regimes.18 The
application of Article 234 to Arctic coastal state waters has raised a number
of key issues, including the required coverage of sea ice that may present a
navigation hazard (“most of the year” or perhaps less ice in an era of profound
sea ice retreat) and the unilateral right of the coastal state to implement
ship construction, equipment, and mariner training standards.
UNCLOS Article 76 allows the coastal state to extend its jurisdictional
continental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit of the EEZ and gain
sovereignty rights over the seabed (not the water column), including
exclusive rights of exploring and exploiting nonliving seabed resources
and sedentary species. (Note: Coastal state fishing rights are limited to the
EEZ.) The maximum extension can be out to 350 nautical miles, depending
on certain geological conditions.19 Coastal states must submit their detailed
marine geo-scientific data to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), located in New York at the United Nations. In 2001,
Russia became the first Arctic state to submit its extended continental shelf
claim to the CLCS.20 Russia argued in its submission that two Arctic
Ocean seabed features, the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha-Mendeleev
Ridge, were natural extensions to its Arctic continental shelf. The CLCS
recommended that this claim required additional geological data. In August 2015, Russia officially resubmitted its Arctic shelf application and the
CLCS is continuing its review.21 Notably, the submitted claims of Denmark
and Canada overlap the Russia’s claim at the North Pole and in other areas;
future negotiations among three parties will be required to sort out the
complex geological data behind the claims.
The Northern Sea Route, Russia’s national Arctic waterway, has historically
been defined in federal law as the set of marine routes from Kara Gate
(strait south of Novaya Zemlya) in the west to the Bering Strait in the east.
It has never included the Barents Sea (see Figure 3.2). A definition of the
Northeast Passage (NEP) better defines ship voyages and marine routes
from northwest Europe (around North Cape, Norway), along the northern
coast of Eurasia, and through the Bering Strait into the Pacific Ocean.22
Russia introduced a new legal regime for the NSR with Federal Law
132-FZ of 28 July 2012 (known by many as the Russian NSR Law).23 The
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new NSR water area is a large marine space encompassing the internal
seas, straits, territorial sea, contiguous zone (out 24 nautical miles from the
baseline), and most of the Arctic EEZ of the Russian Federation. Figure 3.2
identifies the NSR water area, bounded in the west by both Kara Gate and
a longitudinal line from the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya to the EEZ
boundary; the eastern end is in the Bering Strait at the Arctic Circle. Figure
3.2 illustrates plausible routes taken by ships along the NSR, including
routes in the navigation straits through the northern Arctic islands, and the
500-meter isobath. UNCLOS Article 234 is applied within the NSR water
area exercising regulatory control of shipping with the implementation of
special regulations by the administration of the NSR, including mandatory
pilotage and fees for icebreaker escort and support.
The USSR Council of Ministers on 15 January 1985 established by decree a
comprehensive system of straight baselines enclosing its many bays, estuaries,
and, importantly, navigation straits along its Arctic coast.24 Arguing the
“historic” nature of these waters (including, for example, the White Sea and
Ob Gulf ), the landward side of these straight baselines became the internal
waters of the Soviet Union; these baselines also determined where the
12-nautical-mile territorial sea would be measured. The key NSR navigation
straits through the Arctic islands and archipelagoes that remain enclosed by
straight baselines include, moving west to east: Kara Gate, Vilkitsky Strait,
Sannikov Strait, and Dmitry Laptev Strait (see Figure 3.2).25 The legal status
of these “navigation straits” remains contentious, in particular the right of
innocent passage and other possible restrictions.
Two key boundary agreements with Norway and the United States establish
the eastern and western reaches of the Russian maritime Arctic. After nine
years of negotiation, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an
agreement on 1 June 1990 for a maritime boundary in the Bering Sea and
north into the Chukchi Sea.26 The agreement was ratified by the U.S. Senate
on 16 September 1991, but due to criticism of the treaty, the Russian
State Duma has continued to postpone ratification.27 After four decades
of negotiating, Norway and Russia signed (15 September 2010) an agreement on a demarcation line in the Barents Sea. The agreement came into
force in July 2011, resolving disputed areas and overlapping claims under
UNCLOS, and providing new opportunities for cooperation and potential
joint offshore development.28
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Marine Transportation and Economic Development
Throughout its history, the NSR has been about creating an effective
waterway to gain access to the Russian Arctic and its vast natural resources.
During the Soviet era, the NSR was used for two main purposes: resupplying
ports, communities, and defense establishments during summer along
the length of the northern coast; and establishing a regular marine transportation system between Murmansk and Dudinka on the Yensiey River.
Raw hard minerals such as nickel and copper ores were produced in the
industrial complex at Norilsk, carried by rail to the port of Dudinka, and
taken by sea to smelters on the Kola Peninsula. The finished products were
primarily used to support the Soviet defense industry. Strategically, these
critical natural resources remained independent of global commodity
supplies and pricing. During the 21st century, the NSR has been an essential
waterway to support resupply, naval operations, and above all, facilitate
the marine export of natural resources to global markets.
Today, Nornickel (formerly Norilsk Nickel) is one of the world’s largest
metal producers.29 Finished metals are shipped out of Dudinka using a fleet
of five advanced icebreaking carriers that are small container ships; the
ships are Finnish-designed and were built in Finnish and German shipyards.

Icebreaking container ship Norilsk Nickel that routinely sails from the port of Dudinka
carrying finished metals of the company Nornickel. (Aker Arctic)
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The Norilsk-class ships sail year-round to Murmansk, normally without
icebreaker escort, and several ships have carried their cargoes nonstop to
European ports.30 During summer navigation seasons since 2012, Norilsk
ships have carried products on voyages eastbound through the Bering Strait
and to Asian markets.31
The largest natural resource development projects in the entire Arctic today
are located in the Ob Gulf on the western shore of the Yamal Peninsula. A
new LNG plant and the port of Sabetta have been constructed, and a fleet
of icebreaking LNG carriers are carrying Yamal gas out of Sabetta to markets
in Europe and Asia via the NSR.32 At the southern end of the Ob Gulf,
a second Arctic port complex, Novy Port, has been built as an oil export
terminal.33 Icebreaking tankers and escort icebreakers have been able to
maintain year-round shipments westward to Murmansk and, in summer,
east into the Pacific Ocean and Asian ports.
The new Arctic transportation system with its hub at Sabetta was developed
with Russian and international marine operators, investors, and stakeholders.
Finland’s Aker Arctic Technology designed the LNG icebreaking carriers,
and 15 ships of the initial fleet were built at South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. The first ship in the fleet, Christophe
de Margerie, is owned by Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest shipping company;
ownership of the additional 14 ships includes Japan’s Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
(MOL), China LNG Shipping. Sinotrans of Singapore, and the global
shippers Teekey LNG Partners and Dynagas.34
A range of international companies assisted in dredging the waterway and
constructing a new port and LNG facility. The Joint Stock Company Yamal
LNG enjoyed broad domestic and foreign investment: Novatek (50.1%);
French oil and gas company Total (20%); China National Petroleum
Corporation (20%); and China’s Silk Road Fund (9.9%).35 For the ongoing
development of a second LNG facility (LNG 2) on the eastern shore of the
Ob Gulf, Novatek, Total, and China National Petroleum Corporation have
been joined by a Japanese Arctic LNG consortium (Mitsui and Japan Oil,
Gas, and Metals National Corporation).36 These significant and historic
foreign investments in the Russian Arctic illustrate more integration of the
region with the global economy. However, how long these international
investments will last is a key uncertainty.

46 maritime irregular warfare studies
Arctic shipping data for the NSR was challenging to obtain during the Soviet
era, but information on the number of voyages and total annual tonnages
became available in the 1990s. During Soviet times, an annual maximum of
6.6 million tons of cargo was reached in 1987 along the NSR, consisting of cargo
carried by 331 ships in a remarkable 1,306 voyages.37 However, given the
financial burdens of the early years of the Russian Federation (with very low
federal funding for the Russian Arctic), the total annual NSR tonnage declined
by 2002 to 1.6 million tons carried by 47 ships on 170 voyages38; apart from
several Finnish-flag icebreaking tankers servicing Arctic ports, there were very
few foreign ships along the NSR. In 2010 and 2015 the annual cargo
tonnages were 2.5 and 5.3 million tons respectively. With the increases of
LNG carriers and tankers sailing out of the Ob Gulf, the NSR has experienced exponential growth in annual cargoes, from 10.7 million tons in 2017
to 19.7 million tons in 2018 and 31.5 million tons in 2019.39 The vast majority
of these recent cargoes were carried by ships on destinational voyages; only 27
ships sailed on full trans-Arctic voyages along the NSR (with 491,342 tons of
cargo). In his March 2018 state of the nation address, President Putin decreed
that the annual total cargo on the NSR should be 80 million tons by 2024, an
ambitious but potentially achievable goal, given the completion of the LNG 2
facility and anticipated increases in oil and coal exports.40
A new Russian federal law dated 11 December 2018 (number 525) outlined a
revamped management structure for the NSR. In this law (signed by President Putin on 28 December) the state nuclear power agency, Rosatom Corporation, became the management authority for the NSR and the lead government agency involved in development of the Russian maritime Arctic.41
This is a significant and controversial shift in authority from the Ministry of
Transport (and its own NSR administration) to Rosatom. Rosatom’s Northern Sea Route Directorate will manage the state’s nuclear icebreaker fleet
(which it has done since 2008) and plan the region’s infrastructure development. The Ministry of Transport will remain involved in the development of
NSR regulations, represent Russia in international maritime affairs (such as
at IMO), and other advanced port control and navigation safety issues, but
the Ministry’s overall role in the future of the NSR’s development has been
greatly diminished.
A centerpiece of this new management approach is the nuclear icebreaking
fleet: four nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear icebreaking carrier currently
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Nuclear Icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy
The Russian nuclear icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy (50
Years of Victory) was built at the Baltic Shipyard in
St. Petersburg and launched 29 December 1993.
However, due to the severe financial situation in Russia following the collapse of the USSR, the ship was
not completed and operational until 23 March 2007.
50 Let Pobedy is the sixth and final of the Arktika-class
icebreakers operated since 1975 by the Soviet Union
and Russian Federation; the Yamal, operational since
1992, is the only other Arktika-class ship in service.
The nuclear icebreakers are civilian, governmentowned ships operated by Rosatomflot, an organization
within Rosatom, the State Atomic Energy Corporation.
The nuclear icebreakers have a steam turbine electric
power plant: the nuclear reactors produce hot water
and steam, which drive steam turbines; the turbines
are connected to generators that produce electricity
fed to electric motors attached to the three shafts and
propellers. Thus, the engineering plants are large and
complex, and these ships are expensive to construct.
However, they provide nearly unlimited access and
sustained Arctic operations.

SHIP CHARACTERISTICS
•	
Length: 159.6 m; Beam: 30 m; Draft:11.08 m;
Displacement/tonnage: 25,840 tons.
•	
Propulsive power: 58 megawatts (75,000 shaft
horsepower distributed to three shafts).
•	
Full open water speed: 19.5 knots; Maximum
speed: 22 knots.

CONSTRUCTION DETAILS
•	
Twin OK-900A pressure water reactors, each
producing 171 megawatts of power; refueling is
estimated to be every four to five years.
•	
Ice Class PC1, highest in the international system
(ship is capable of year-round operations in all polar
waters) and LL-1, highest in the Russian system.

The Russian nuclear icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy
("50 Years of Victory") at the North Pole
(Christoper Michel/Flickr)

•	
Steel hull plating is 46 mm thick; a stainless steel
“ice belt” of 5-7 mm is installed where ice meets
the hull around the entire waterline.
•	
Flight deck and hanger for two helicopters.

ICEBREAKING CAPABILITY
AND FEATURES
•	
Capable of breaking 2.8-meter thick level sea
ice at a continuous speed of 3 knots.
•	
Modified bow is “spoon-shaped,” reportedly
to improve icebreaking through thick ice.
•	
An installed “air bubbler system” (water jets
below the waterline) reduces friction of ice
and snow along the hull during icebreaking.
•	
Installed internal ballast tanks are forward, aft,
and athwartships; and a pumping system moves
ballast water rapidly between tanks to induce
rolling and pitching of the ship if it becomes
stuck in the ice.
•	
Ship can break ice going ahead and astern.
•	
A “towing notch” is fitted on the stern where the
bow of a ship being escorted can be coupled to
the icebreaker with cables and towed or dragged
through difficult ice.

COMPLEMENT

•	Double-hulled ship with ballast water between
the hulls; ship is divided into 10 watertight compartments (for damage control and survivability).

•	
Total 108: 51 officers and 58 other ranks
(all Russian merchant mariners).

•	
Single rudder and three fixed propellers, each
with four 7-ton blades.

•	
Total guests/passengers (for polar tourist
voyages): 128 in 64 cabins.

SOURCES: Observations of the author and R. K. Headland (Scott Polar Research Institute, Cambridge University);
reference material from Rosatomflot and Murmansk Shipping Company.
Figure 3.7 Russian nuclear icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy
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operational, with ongoing construction of new nuclear icebreakers and plans
for even larger icebreakers of the Leader class.42 (See Figure 3.8.) Although
many of the most advanced icebreaking carriers now operating on the NSR
can sail without icebreaker escort for an estimated six months, the nuclear
icebreaker fleet will be escorting ships in convoy to potentially extend the
navigation season to 10 to 12 months. The marine managers within Rosatom
remain convinced that the icebreaker convoy system using nuclear icebreakers,
a legacy of the Soviet era, is an effective model for the NSR’s future.
The seasonality of navigation along the NSR means it is highly unlikely that
it can be a regular and reliable trans-Arctic trade route between the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans for container shipping. However, Russian shipping experts
have noted that the NSR could become a “seasonal supplement” to the marine
traffic through the Suez and Panama canals.43 Even this more positive view
may underestimate the serious challenges for the NSR becoming an oceanto-ocean global trade route, however. Key constraints include the vagaries of
Arctic weather and sea ice along the Route; “just-in-time” cargo strategies by
global container shippers; the lack of viable ports along the NSR for multiple
cargo transfers; shallow depth in several NSR navigation straits; higher marine
insurance rates; icebreaker fees for escort; higher ship construction costs for
polar-class commercial ships; and slower ship speeds in icebreaker convoys.
A recent proposal to develop trans-shipment container ports on either end
of the NSR could overcome several of these constraints.44 Importantly for
this proposed state-run operation, Russia would assume much of the risk
associated with navigation along the NSR, using Russian-flag container ships
escorted by nuclear and non-nuclear icebreakers. The economic and feasibility
analyses of this trans-shipment option are ongoing, and it is unknown if
government subsidies of such a large venture can be anticipated. It is plausible
that some trans-Arctic traffic along the NSR will emerge in seasonal niche
markets, perhaps for short-term charters of bulk carriers taking advantage of
longer summer seasons of access.
The future of the NSR is highly uncertain, with multiple drivers influencing
the way ahead. However, two key factors will influence, and perhaps constrain,
maritime commerce flows along the NSR: the basic economics of the global
shipping enterprise; and global demand and commodities prices.
It is likely a majority of NSR marine traffic will continue to sail on destinational
voyages vice trans-Arctic navigation. Independently operated icebreaking
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Russian Nuclear Icebreakers - Current and Planned
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Figure 3.8 Current and Planned Russian Nuclear Ships and Vessels
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One
important
continued investment in marine infrastructure including ports; response
capability; hydrography and charting; aids to navigation; icebreakers;
communications; and monitoring and surveillance. Implementation and
enforcement of the IMO Polar Code in the Russian maritime Arctic will
be an additional factor in the use of international shipping in the region.
Despite the many uncertainties, natural resource development will remain the
key stimulus for increasing marine activity throughout the Russian Arctic.
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National Security and the Arctic Maritime Frontier
It is clear the Russian maritime Arctic is a vast space with changing accessibility
in response to a warming planet, as well as a region of expanding resource
development and marine traffic. The complexities and uncertainties of this
changing Arctic region present a range of national security challenges and
opportunities for the Russian Federation, including the following:
•	Common defense of its Arctic citizens, natural resource wealth, civil
assets, military facilities, and overall infrastructure;
•	Maintenance of a visible, year-round, sovereign presence in its Arctic
waters and a robust capability to move naval assets across the northern
coast of Eurasia (from Atlantic to Pacific oceans) using a fleet of
nuclear and non-nuclear powered icebreakers;
•	Maintenance of year-round access to the Arctic Ocean and Atlantic
Ocean for the Russian Navy, especially for its submarine force,
including strategic nuclear capability;
•	Protection of a maritime space to conduct large-scale naval and air
exercises inside its Arctic EEZ and in international waters; and
•	Utilization of a unique and large coastal space for the conduct of a
broad range of weapons tests and research in largely remote and
unpopulated areas.
Notably, the Kola Peninsula in northwest European Russia, a region north
of the Arctic Circle, is one of the most militarized regions of the Russian
Federation45 (and one of the most concentrated military areas on Earth).
Bases of the strategic air force and navy are located throughout this area
and the White Sea; the headquarters of Russia’s largest naval force, the
Northern Fleet, is located in the port of Severomorsk on the Murmansk
Fjord.46 The strategic importance of the Kola Peninsula cannot be overemphasized. Its coastal waters are ice-free year-round, allowing naval assets
direct access to the Arctic and Atlantic oceans. Its ice-free port of Murmansk
is a critical commercial hub with maritime links to Europe, and serves as
the major gateway to the NSR in the east.
One of the opportunities presented by ice-free and longer summer seasons
along the NSR has been the recent deployment of naval ships that are not
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ice-capable. During August and September 2013 a naval task force of 10
warships and support vessels sailed from Severomorsk across the Barents,
Kara, and Laptev seas to Kotelny Island in the New Siberian Islands. Included
in the force was the nuclear powered cruiser Pyotr Veliky (Peter the Great).
The mission was to assist in rebuilding a small naval base on Kotelny Island.47
A key feature of this operation was the employment of four (civilian)
nuclear icebreakers (Yamal, Taymyr, Vaygach, and 50 Let Pobedy) to escort
the task group through several stretches of thick ice. This operation is clear
evidence of the use of the nuclear icebreaker fleet, in this case the entire
four-ship fleet (operated by Rosatom, the civilian nuclear power state
agency), as a national asset in support of Russia’s Arctic security interests.
Another naval force of note sailed from Severomorsk east into the Kara Sea
off the Taymyr Peninsula during August and September 2019.48 The flotilla
was composed of the anti-submarine ship Vice Admiral Kulakov, two landing
ships, one tanker, and a rescue tug. Its mission was to practice defense of
the region’s economic activity and exercise marine response such as salvage
and rescue operations. The Russian Navy has also deployed its hydrographic
ships to several Arctic island groups in summer over the past decade to
survey their navigation straits.
Maintaining a military presence in Russia’s most northerly Arctic territories
has been a funding challenge since the end of the Soviet Union. Most
remote (Arctic) bases were abandoned in the early 1990s. Two military
outposts have been recently rebuilt with large runways: one on Alexandra
Island in Franz Josef Land, now Russia’s most northernmost military base,
and one on Kotelny Island.49 Both are limited, but permanent, facilities
designed to provide sovereign presence and act as monitoring outposts.
Further, both have modern runways that can support Russian air assets to
project military power, further securing Russia’s strategic presence in the
maritime Arctic. A third significant military presence in the Russian Arctic
was established in September 2019 on Novaya Zemlya. A new S-4000 antiaircraft missile system and a combat team of operators were placed on the
archipelago to protect a large area of airspace in the eastern Barents Sea.50
These small military bases reinforce Russia’s territorial claims in the Arctic
and provide much-needed infrastructure to support monitoring of marine
operations and shipping along the NSR.
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Figure 3.9 Kotelny Island with arctic base shown. (Satelite photo European
Space Agency, Center for Strategic and International Studies)

In summary, national security issues in the Arctic will continue to receive
high-priority attention and funding in the Russian Federation. With greater
seasonal marine access, there are very likely to be increases in naval vessel and
task force operations in the NSR water area, supplying bases, moving naval
combatants along the NSR, and conducting advanced cold-regions exercises in
ice-free and ice-covered waters. It also remains highly likely that any freedom
of navigation operations by foreign navies and coast guards (in summer) near
and within the NSR navigation straits, and any perceived territorial challenges,
will be met by rapid and serious responses using naval and air force assets.
Investments in new surveillance and monitoring systems, focusing on longrange radars and satellite systems (one such monitoring facility and military
base is located on Wrangel Island), should enhance Russia’s early warning
networks over the Arctic Ocean. Operational testing of new systems such as
hypersonic weapons and cold-weather drones (unmanned aircraft) in the maritime Arctic will likely continue a path to modernizing the military’s capability
in the extreme Arctic environment. The overall challenge will be to balance
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Russia’s investments in strategic military infrastructure with its broad
ambitions and economic plans to develop its Arctic natural resource wealth.

International Engagement in Arctic and Maritime Affairs
The Russian Federation has advanced its national Arctic and maritime interests by emphasizing cooperation in three key international organizations.
At the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Russia was an active
participant for more than two decades, using its extensive polar expertise
in the development of the International Code for Ships Operating in the
Polar Waters (Polar Code), fully in force on 1 July 2018.51 Significantly, a
Russian-flagged tanker, Shturman Albanov, became the world’s first ship
certified in compliance with the IMO Polar Code on 22 December 2016.52
This proactive approach by the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping is
a positive indicator for the future implementation and hopeful enforcement
of the Polar Code throughout the Russian maritime Arctic. At the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), Russia is a founding state
member of its Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission, devoted
to stimulating hydrographc activity and developing new charts for the
Arctic.53 And, in March 2011, the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), in concert with IMO and IHO, announced that Russia, Norway,
and Canada had accepted lead roles in the expansion of the World-Wide
Navigational Warning System into Arctic waters, taking responsibility for
establishing five new WMO METAREAS (IMO NAVAREAS) in the Arctic
and for coordination of the transmission of meteorological and navigation
hazard information to mariners on international voyages. The new Arctic
areas became operational in June 2011.54
Since the establishment of the Arctic Council by the Ottawa Declaration
(19 September 1996), Russia has worked with seven other Arctic state
members on the Council’s two main foci of sustainable development and
environmental protection.55 Russia was the Arctic Council Chair during
2004–06 and hosted the 5th Ministerial Meeting in Salekhard in October
2006; Russia now holds the chair for 2021–2023. Russian experts have
been active in the Council’s working groups dealing with emergency response,
protection of the Arctic marine environment, Arctic contaminants, and
Arctic climate change. Russian scientists, government experts, and institutions
have contributed to many of the Council’s assessments and reports, notably
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the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) released in November
2004 and the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) released in
April 2009. AMSA’s report and recommendations, which provide a policy
framework for marine safety and environmental protection in the Arctic
Ocean, were approved by the eight Arctic state ministers including Foreign
Minister Lavrov of the Russian Federation.56
Three treaties have been negotiated by the Arctic states with Russia (and
the United States) playing lead roles: the Agreement on Cooperation on
Aeonautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, signed in Nuuk,
Greenland on 2 May 2011; the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil
Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic, signed in Kiruna,
Sweden on 15 May 2013; and the Agreement on Enhancing International
Arctic Scientific Cooperation, signed in Fairbanks, Alaska, on 11 May
2017.57 During these efforts, the eight Arctic states used the Arctic Council
structure to facilitate stakeholder engagement in the negotiation process to
include Arctic Indigenous peoples, non-Arctic states, and other institutional
observers. Each of these binding agreements include practical outcomes of
direct relevance to marine safety, environmental protection, and scientific
research in the Russian maritime Arctic. Also relevant to cooperation in
the maritime Arctic is the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, established in 2015 by
the coast guards and maritime agencies of the Arctic states as an independent
organization (not bound by treaty).58 Russia is represented in the Forum by
the Coast Guard Department of the Federal Security Service and contributes
to its work to strengthen cooperation and coordination, collaborate with the
Arctic Council, and facilitate safe and secure Arctic maritime activity.
Russia’s recent Arctic multilateral engagement can be illustrated by two
activities, one diplomatic and another involving international Arctic science.
On 3 October 2018, the five Arctic Ocean coastal states—Russia, the
United States, Norway, Canada, and Denmark—along with China, Japan,
South Korea, Iceland, and the European Union, signed an agreement to
prevent unregulated commercial fishing in the high seas of the Central
Arctic Ocean.59 This historic agreement was ratified by the 10 parties in
June 2021. Most recently Russia has been closely involved in the planning
for the international Arctic drift expedition MOSAIC (Multidisciplinary
Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate), the largest scientific
expedition ever conducted in the Central Arctic Ocean.60 An international
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consortium of polar research institutions led by Germany’s Alfred Wegener
Institute for Polar and Marine Research, Russia’s Arctic and Antarctic
Research Institute (in St. Petersburg), and the University of Colorado
designed the expedition; the German research icebreaker Polarstern was
frozen into Arctic sea ice in September 2019, commencing a one-year drift in
the Central Arctic Ocean that was completed in October 2020. Icebreakers
and research vessels from Russia and Germany supported the expedition.

Discussion Questions

Geography and the Environment
1. M
 any in the media and in the Arctic community itself speak to an “icefree” Arctic Ocean. What do they mean when they use this terminology
regarding Arctic sea ice in the Arctic Ocean?
2. Five Arctic Ocean coastal states enclose or bound the high seas of the
Central Arctic Ocean. What are the implications for marine access?
3. What would be the impact if the Barents Sea was included in the legal
definition of the NSR?
4. T
 wo navigation straits through the New Siberian Islands have maximum
water depths of 13 and 6.7 meters. What ships might be capable of
navigating safely through these waters, and what are the implications
for international marine traffic across the NSR?

Governance and Boundaries
5. Why do the United States and other nations argue that Russia’s
straight baselines across the NSR major straits (and declaration of
internal waters) do not conform to international law?
6. U
 NCLOS Article 234 requires the regions under national jurisdiction
to be ice-covered for “most of the year.” What are the implications
when the sea ice retreats enough so that the region is ice-covered only
half the year?
7. R
 ussia’s Duma has never ratified the US-USSR 1990 maritime boundary
agreement in the Bering and Chukchi seas. What would be the implications if Russia decided to disregard this boundary in all its future
maritime operations in the region?
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8. H
 ow should the United States respond to Russian challenges to
innocent passage of ships through the Northern Sea Route straits and
other restrictive regulations within Arctic waters defined by the NSR
water area?

Marine Transportation and Economic Development
9. W
 hat are the constraints for trans-Arctic shipping on the NSR and
across the Russian maritime Arctic?
10. What factors are important in establishing the length of the ice navigation season along the NSR?
11. D
 iscuss the elements of maritime infrastructure required to make the
NSR a safe, secure, and efficient national waterway.
12. H
 ow vulnerable is the continued development of oil and gas in the
Russian Arctic to international commodity prices and long-term
climate change developments?
13. W
 hat are the implications of an extended ice navigation season and
large commercial ship (for example, LNG icebreaking carriers) voyages
in winter through the Bering Strait region?
14. W
 hat are the strategies that the Russian Federation can pursue to
make the NSR a more competitive trans-Arctic shipping route?

National Security and the Arctic Maritime Frontier
15. D
 iscuss the geographic and environmental vulnerabilities that impact
national security in the Russian Arctic.
16. What are the types of monitoring and surveillance systems (oceans,
air, and space) that can be effectively employed throughout the Russian
maritime Arctic?
17. H
 ow does the new Russian Arctic strategy to 2035 balance economic
development with requirements for military security?
18. R
 ussia has recently launched a new armed icebreaker for the Navy, the
Ivan Papanin. What are the implications of Russia potentially building
more ice-capable surface combatants for operation in Arctic waters?
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19. W
 hat are the plausible outcomes of United States and United Kingdom
navies deciding to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations within the
Russian maritime Arctic?
20. D
 iscuss Russia’s desire to increase defensive measures at the Kola
Peninsula, and any connected security implications that may cause
Russia to shift military resources from other areas.

International Engagement in Arctic and Maritime Affairs
21. H
 ow might the eight Arctic states work together to implement and
enforce the mandatory IMO Polar Code?
22. D
 iscuss what Russia’s contributions might be in response to a maritime
disaster under the international Arctic Search and Rescue Treaty.
23. D
 iscuss the implications of Russia signing the agreement to prevent
unregulated commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.
24. Th
 e Russian Coast Guard, as a department in the FSB, is a member of
the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. How can Russia enhance cooperation
among the Arctic coast guards in enforcement issues?
25. Russia became chair of the Arctic Council from 2021–2023. Discuss
the challenges Russia’s leadership faces within the Arctic Council.
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Conclusions

LNG icebreaking carrier Christophe de Magerie, owned and operated by
the Russian shipping company Sovcomflot. (Aker Arctic)

Apparent throughout this discussion has been the vastness, complex
geography, and extreme cold environment of this once remote Arctic
region that was tightly controlled and effectively closed during the Soviet
Union era. It is not evident, however, that the Russian maritime Arctic is
more open and less controlled today by the state, despite the expanding
marine links carrying Russian Arctic natural resources to global markets.

Illustrations of Future Change
The creation process of a scenario, or plausible future, of the Russian maritime Arctic in 2050 serves to illustrate the complexity of drivers of change
and uncertainties that can influence the future of this developing region.
Several key outcomes are identified by this strategic thinking process:
•	
There is a clear emergence of a more integrated, operationally
efficient, and safe Northern Sea Route operation with improving
marine infrastructure. Strategic plans will likely call for a 12-month
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navigation season to be attained along the length of the NSR with
nuclear icebreaker support (the key rationale for large investments in
a modern nuclear icebreaker fleet). Operations will provide for the
expanded escort of commercial ships and continued movement of
naval assets (in summer) along the NSR.
•	National security and economic development are the dominant state
interests in the region.61 Arctic resource development and resource
connections to global markets are critical to Russia’s long-term
financial health.
•	The retreat of Arctic sea ice is providing for greater marine access and
longer seasons of navigation along the NSR.62 However, in contrast,
terrestrial access will continue to be more challenging in many regions,
with the ongoing thawing of permafrost making infrastructure construction in the Arctic coastal zone more difficult and costly.
•	The long, remote Russian Arctic coast and its widely spaced marine
infrastructure are potentially vulnerable to electronic (cyber) warfare
and the possible incursion of advanced vehicles (for example, UAVs
and drones). However, a recent buildup of monitoring and surveillance
systems (including fiber optic cables in the EEZ) will tighten control
of the region in all seasons and plausibly mitigate future infiltrations.
•	The Russian maritime Arctic could become a region of conflict
if other nations were to contest the NSR navigation straits with
freedom of navigation operations and contest the highly regulated
waters of the Russian Arctic EEZ and NSR water area.
•	
President Putin has been particularly bullish and supportive of
economic development in the Russian Arctic, approving federal
funds for marine infrastructure including icebreakers and broad tax
incentives to select energy companies. The fundamental question is
how this support plays out after President Putin’s retirement, which
may not be until 2036, or even earlier.
•	
Russia has been an influential and engaged state within the Arctic
Council and in international organizations (for example, the International Maritime Organization, the International Hydographic
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Organization, and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum) dealing with
maritime and Arctic affairs.
•	
Global energy markets and uncertainties in future oil and gas prices,
coupled with mitigation efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
will likely constrain future Russian Arctic hydrocarbon developments.
•	There are many uncertainties and potential unknown consequences
of climate change impacts throughout the Russian Federation and
especially in its large Arctic region. Historic high summer temperatures,
permafrost thawing, increased seasonal river flooding, and increases
in widespread (Siberian) wildfires are four regional impacts observed
today that will likely continue in the decades ahead.63
•	
A majority of future ships along the NSR most likely will be on
destinational voyages. Use of the NSR and Northeast Passage
for trans-Arctic voyaging will plausibly be seasonal, limited, and
supplemental to other global trade routes such as the Suez Canal.64
There remains great uncertainty as to how the Northeast Passage
(including the NSR) will be used for future trans-Arctic (ocean to
ocean) voyaging.
•	
Pursuit of long-term geopolitical stability in the Arctic would be one
plausible strategy that supports Russia’s quest to develop its northern
resource wealth.

Areas for Future Research
The Russian Arctic is a unique and complex region influenced by climate
change, global economics, and strategic geopolitics. Due to its immense size,
geographical tools of synthesis and analysis will be applied to gain a better
understanding of the linkages between environmental change and economic
development. There is no doubt that climate change will have significant
regional and global implications, placing added importance on satellite
monitoring of this vast Arctic region. Interdisciplinary research will be key
with a focus on holistic and integrated approaches to handle the complexity
of factors. Potential areas of further research include the following:
• 	Analyses of the changes in marine access due to Arctic sea ice retreat
and the impacts on commercial navigation, naval operations, and
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the length of the navigation season; such research will be supplemented
by nongovernmental monitoring of marine traffic using advanced
automatic identification system data;
• 	The Russia-China relationship in the Arctic regarding long-term
resource contracts and infrastructure investments, and China’s
commercial use of the NSR;
• 	The economic impacts of global climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts on the future of Russian Arctic hydrocarbon developments;
• 	The extreme environmental changes ongoing throughout the Russian
Arctic and their global implications, especially the release of methane
from thawing permafrost;
• 	Integrated studies on the impacts on, mitigation strategies employed,
and future of the Russian Arctic Indigenous peoples;
• 	The future of seabed claims under UNCLOS Article 76 in the Central
Arctic Ocean, especially the claims of Canada, Denmark, and Russia
that overlap at the North Pole.

Final Thoughts
How Russia performs in the 21st-century global economy will depend in
part on its development of Arctic natural resources and the safe, effective use
of its maritime Arctic. Operating as a National Arctic Waterway, the NSR
will continue to facilitate the shipping of Russia’s natural resources out of
the region to global markets. However, global economic forces (for example,
long-term volatile commodities pricing and climate change mitigation
measures) will strongly influence an uncertain economic future for the
region. The unique high-latitude geography of the Russian Federation will
continue to focus the state’s importance of the Russian Arctic to national
defense and its geopolitical roles in the Arctic and the world at large.
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Discussion Questions
1. W
 hat are the significant climate change impacts on development of the
Russian Arctic?
2. H
 ow long will the state investments, incentives, and strategic focus on
developing the Russian Arctic be sustained?
3. What are plausible futures for the Russia-China relationship in the Arctic?
4. What are plausible futures for Russia-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic?
5. H
 ow might Arctic disagreements disrupt the economic development
in the region and the uses of the Arctic Ocean for marine traffic?
6. C
 an the NSR today be considered “open” for trans-Arctic international
maritime traffic by foreign-flag commercial ships as a global trade route?
7. D
 iscuss the many factors and uncertainties that make the future of the
Russian maritime Arctic so complex and challenging to peer into.
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Appendix: Chronology of Key Events Regarding the Russian
Maritime Arctic, 1990–2020
Sources: Arctic Today; The Independent Barents Observer; Moscow Times;
press releases from Sovcomflot, Rosatom, Rosneft and Novatek; Arctic
State Agreements (2013, 2015, and 2017); Russian federal laws; and
doctrines and strategies of the Russian Federation.
May 1993–November 1999
	International Northern Sea Route Programme led by the Fridtjof Nansen
Institute (Norway), Ship & Ocean Foundation ( Japan), and the Central
Marine Research and Design Institute (Russia).
August 1997
First foreign-flag merchant ship transit of the full Northern Sea Route by
the Finnish tanker Uikku.
July 2001
	
President Putin approves the Marine Doctrine of the Russian Federation
to 2020, which highlights the significance of the Arctic to the Russian
Navy and the importance of the NSR to regional development.
December 2002
	Annual traffic and total tonnage along the NSR reach a low of 47 ships
(on 170 voyages) carrying 1.6 million tons of cargo.
December 2002–April 2006
	
Arctic Operational Platform (ARCOP) EU-funded project on the marine
transportation of oil and gas along the western NSR to Europe.
May 2003
	
A new energy strategy for Russia up to 2020 is approved and notes the
strategic importance oil and gas in the Barents Sea, Kara Sea, and Yamal
Peninsula.
April 2006
	New icebreaking container vessel, Norilsk Nickel, is delivered to the
Nornickel metallurgical company, the first of a five-ship fleet of independently operated (without icebreaker escort) icebreaking ships sailing
between Dudinka and Murmansk.
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June 2008
	A new offshore (year-round) oil terminal at Varandey in the Pechora Sea
begins operation and is serviced by three icebreaking shuttle tankers that
sail to Murmansk.
September 2008
	
President Medvedev approves the Foundations of the State Policy of the
Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and Beyond, outlining Russian
national Arctic interests.
April 2009
	Release of the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
(Tromso, Norway), an Arctic state framework for Arctic marine safety
and environmental protection.
July 2010
	The floating nuclear power plant Akademik Lomonosov is launched in
St. Petersburg; not until August and September 2019 was the vessel
towed along the NSR to the port of Pevek (the plant produced power
for the city in December 2019).
May 2011
	
Arctic state Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue in the Arctic signed in Nuuk, Greenland.
August 2011
	
Exxon Mobil and Rosneft agree to joint operations and oil drilling on
the continental shelf of the Kara Sea.
July 2012
	Russian Federal Law 132-FZ defining the Northern Sea Route water
area enacted.
November–December 2012
	Pioneering early winter voyage of the LNG carrier Ob River from
Hammerfest, Norway to Tobata, Japan and first LNG shipment across
the Russian maritime Arctic (and NSR).
February 2013
	President Putin approves the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic
Zone of the Russian Federation focusing on development, environmental
challenges, and national security in the Russian Arctic.
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May 2013
	
Arctic state Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response in the Arctic signed in Kiruna, Sweden.
July–August 2013
Construction begins on the new port facility of Sabetta in Ob Gulf.
September 2013
	
The Greenpeace ship Arctic Sunrise is forcibly boarded by the Federal
Security Service and towed to Murmansk after activists boarded Gazprom’s Prirazlomnoya drilling platform in the Pechora Sea (and after
sailing into the Kara Sea).
December 2013
	
Oil production begins at the offshore platform Prirazlomnaya in the
Pechora Sea; oil is carried by icebreaking shuttle tanker to Murmansk.
August 2015
	Russia resubmits its claim to the Arctic outer continental shelf to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with
UNCLOS Article 76.
May 2016
	President Putin opens a new oil terminal in Novy Port at the southern
end of the Ob Gulf; first summer oil is carried by tankers to European
customers.
June 2016
	Launching at the Baltic Shipyard of the polar icebreaker Arktika, the
world’s most powerful icebreaker, and first of a class of five ships.
May 2017
	
Arctic state Agreement on Enhancing International Scientific Cooperation
in the Arctic signed in Fairbanks, Alaska.
October 2017
	
Novatek announces plans for an LNG trans-shipment terminal in
Kamchatka; icebreaking LNG carriers would transfer LNG to
conventional carriers.
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December 2017
	First shipment of LNG out of Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula aboard
the icebreaking LNG carrier Christophe de Margarie (172,600 cubic
meters of gas), marking a new era for the NSR.
January 2018
	
China releases its Arctic policy white paper that includes mention of
joint opportunities to build a “Polar Silk Road,” a component of China’s
Belt & Road Initiative.
March 2018
	President Putin issues his national priorities for the next six years, including
a decree for the NSR to achieve an annual cargo of 80 million tons by 2024.
July 2018
	
The IMO International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters comes
fully into force with inclusion of polar mariner training and experience
requirements.
October 2018
	
The five Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia,
and the United States) together with China, the European Union, Iceland,
Japan, and South Korea sign the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated
High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.
December 2018
	President Putin signs a new law outlining the broad authority of Rosatom
to manage and develop infrastructure for the NSR.
June 2019
	
Two Japanese investors, Mitsui and Japan Oil, Gas, & Metals National
Corporation, sign as partners with Novatek (and others) to develop the
LNG 2 facility on the eastern shore of the Ob Bay.
September 2019
	
Novatek and Sovcomflot announce a joint venture to develop a fleet
of 17 icebreaking LNG carriers to be built in Russia and delivered
2023–2026.
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October 2019
	
Launching in St. Petersburg of the Russian Navy “combat” icebreaker Ivan
Papanin to be commissioned in 2022 or 2023 for patrols in Arctic waters.
December 2019
	Annual tonnage along the NSR reaches 31.5 million tons; Rosatom
announces that a new NSR management center for Arctic shipping will
be located in Murmansk and operational in 2020.
January 2020
	
Prime Minister Medvedev signed a resolution allocating 127 billion rubles
for construction of the first mega-icebreaker of the Leader nuclear class.
January 2020
	
New Prime Minister Mishustin announces legislation for a new tax
regime and incentives for the Russian Arctic to stimulate oil, gas, and
minerals development.
March 2020
	President Putin signs a decree, Foundations of the Russian Federation
State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035, a new Arctic strategy
that outlines Russia’s national priorities in the Arctic.
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Study Guide
Discussion Questions — from the text
CHAPTER ONE
1. What conditions or assumptions does this scenario rely on?
2. W
 hat other national domestic developments might evolve in the Russian
Arctic in the next 30 years?
3. How might international geopolitical events both in and outside the
Arctic influence the future of the region?

CHAPTER TWO
1. Discuss these potential influential factors and major drivers of change.
2. W
 hat is a more significant driver of marine use in the region, climate
change or natural resource development? Explain.
3. W
 hat are the reasons for the long-term loss of population in Russia’s
northern cities, and how might economic issues, and demographic
trends influence development of the Russian Arctic?
4. How might China or other regional powers respond to Russia’s efforts
to exert more control over the NSR?
5. Discuss how international investors in the development of Yamal LNG
(i.e., France, China, Japan, and South Korea) might influence the economic
outcomes of the Russian Arctic.

CHAPTER THREE
Geography and the Environment
1. M
 any in the media and in the Arctic community itself, speak to an “icefree” Arctic Ocean. What do they mean when they use this terminology
regarding Arctic sea ice in the Arctic Ocean?
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2. F
 ive Arctic Ocean coastal states enclose or bound high seas of the Central
Arctic Ocean. What are the implications for marine access?
3. What would be the impact if all of the Barents Sea was included in the
legal definition of the NSR?
4. T
 wo navigation straits through the New Siberian Islands have maximum
water depths of 13 and 6.7 meters. What ships might be capable of
navigating safely through these waters, and what are the implications
for international marine traffic across the NSR?

Governance and Boundaries
5. W
 hy do the United States and other nations argue that Russia’s straight
baselines across the NSR major straits (and declaration of internal
waters) do not conform to international law?
6. U
 NCLOS Article 234 requires the regions under national jurisdiction to
be ice-covered for “most of the year.” What are the implications when the
sea ice retreats enough so that the region is ice-covered only half the year?
7. R
 ussia’s Duma has never ratified the US-USSR 1990 maritime boundary
agreement in the Bering and Chukchi seas. What would be the implications
if Russia decided to disregard this boundary in all its future maritime
operations in the region?
8. H
 ow should the United States respond to Russian challenges to innocent
passage of ships through the Northern Sea Route straits and other
restrictive regulations within Arctic waters defined by the NSR water area?

Marine Transportation and Economic Development
9. What are the constraints for trans-Arctic shipping on the NSR and
across the Russian maritime Arctic?
10. W
 hat factors are important in establishing the length of the ice navigation season along the NSR?
11. D
 iscuss the elements of maritime infrastructure required to make the
NSR a safe, secure, and efficient national waterway.
12. H
 ow vulnerable is the continued development of oil and gas in the
Russian Arctic to international commodity prices and long-term
climate change developments?
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13. W
 hat are the implications of an extended ice navigation season and
large commercial ship (for example, LNG icebreaking carriers) voyages
in winter through the Bering Strait region?
14. W
 hat are the strategies that the Russian Federation can pursue to
make the NSR a more competitive trans-Arctic shipping route?

National Security and the Arctic Maritime Frontier
15. Discuss the geographic and environmental vulnerabilities that impact
national security in the Russian Arctic.
16. What are the types of monitoring and surveillance systems (oceans,
air, and space) that can be effectively employed throughout the Russian
maritime Arctic?
17. H
 ow does the new Russian Arctic strategy to 2035 balance economic
development with requirements for military security?
18. Russia has recently launched a new armed icebreaker for the Navy, the
Ivan Papanin. What are the implications of Russia potentially building
more ice-capable surface combatants for operation in Arctic waters?
19. W
 hat are the plausible outcomes of United States and United Kingdom
navies deciding to conduct Freedom of Navigation operations within the
Russian maritime Arctic?
20. Discuss Russia’s desire to increase defensive measures at the Kola
Peninsula, and any connected security implications that may cause
Russia to shift military resources from other areas.

International Engagement in Arctic and Maritime Affairs
21. H
 ow might the eight Arctic states work together to implement and
enforce the mandatory IMO Polar Code?
22. D
 iscuss what Russia’s contributions might be in response to a maritime
disaster under the international Arctic Search and Rescue Treaty.
23. D
 iscuss the implications of Russia signing the agreement to prevent
unregulated commercial fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.
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24. Th
 e Russian Coast Guard, as a department in the FSB, is a member of
the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. How can Russia enhance cooperation
among the Arctic coast guards in enforcement issues?
25. Russia became chair of the Arctic Council from 2021–2023. Discuss
the challenges Russia’s leadership faces within the Arctic Council.

CHAPTER FOUR
1. W
 hat are the significant climate change impacts on development of the
Russian Arctic?
2. H
 ow long will the state investments, incentives, and strategic focus on
developing the Russian Arctic be sustained?
3. What are plausible futures for the Russia-China relationship in the Arctic?
4. What are plausible futures for Russia-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic?
5. H
 ow might Arctic disagreements disrupt the economic development
in the region and the uses of the Arctic Ocean for marine traffic?
6. C
 an the NSR today be considered “open” for trans-Arctic international
maritime traffic by foreign-flag commercial ships as a global trade route?
7. D
 iscuss the many factors and uncertainties which make the future of the
Russian maritime Arctic so complex and challenging to peer into.
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